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Parrhesia	and	Democracy:	Truth‐telling,	WikiLeaks	and	the	Arab	Spring		
	
Abstract	
Parrhesia—the	practice	of	truth‐telling—was	adapted	to	various	ancient	legal,	political,	
philosophical	and	religious	contexts.	In	this	essay	we	focus	on	parrhesia	in	politics	and	
its	relevance	for	democracy,	concentrating	on	the	account	given	by	Michel	Foucault.	We	
suggest	that	Foucault’s	approach	to	parrhesia	and	democracy	is	valuable	because	of	its	
stress	on	the	analysis	of	governmental	rationalities	and	the	ethical	comportment	of	
citizens,	rather	than	on	the	normative	dimensions	of	democracy,	as	is	more	usual	(but	
more	sterile)	in	political	thought.	We	take	two	modern	examples	of	truth‐telling’s	role	in	
democracy—the	recent	WikiLeaks	scandal	and	the	political	struggles	in	Tunisia	and	
Egypt—as	a	way	of	assessing	the	value	of	Foucault’s	distinctive	approach	and	the	
relevance	of	parrhesia	for	democracy	today.	
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Parrhesia	and	Democracy:	Truth‐telling,	WikiLeaks	and	the	Arab	Spring1	
	
In	his	final	Collège	de	France	lectures	(only	recently	translated	into	English:	2010;	
2011),	Michel	Foucault	invited	us	to	consider	the	relation	between	parrhesia	(free	
speech	or	truth‐telling)2	and	democracy	in	ancient	Greece.	In	Foucault’s	account,	
parrhesia	formed	a	condition	of	possibility	for	the	emergence	of	democracy	(democracy	
was	built	on	an	acceptance	of	the	right	for	anyone	to	speak),	but	also	paradoxically	
fulfilled	the	opposite	function	of	corroding	already‐existing	democracy	(democracies,	
once	built,	could	be	destroyed	by	speech	against	them).	While	we	suggest	that	Foucault’s	
focus	on	parrhesia	may	be	useful	for	thinking	about	contemporary	concerns,	we	do	not	
see	Foucault’s	work	allowing	a	simple	equivalence	to	be	made	between	ancient	and	
modern	practices.	Rather,	he	invited	us	to	analyse	democracy	not	in	terms	of	a	series	of	
normative	claims	or	theories,	but	by	focusing	on	government	as	historically	conditioned	
and	contingent:	what	sorts	of	practices	and	forms	of	subjectivity	are	the	warp	and	weft	
of	everyday	democracy?	Democracy	need	not	be	understood	as	a	norm—a	collective	
consciousness	or	a	utopia,	for	example—but	as	the	result	of	governmental	rationalities	
and	efforts	to	manage	personal	conduct.	Foucault’s	final	lectures	are	the	only	place	
where	he	directly	addressed	democracy,	but	even	so	it	is	surprising	that	there	is	a	
paucity	of	literature	from	the	governmentality	perspective	which	examines	democracy	
per	se	(Foucault‐inspired	work	on	advanced	liberal	democracies	prefers,	as	a	rule,	to	
focus	on	the	‘liberal’	rather	than	the	‘democratic’),	with	the	notable	exception	of	Hindess	
(e.g.	1991;	1996).	We	see	some	value,	then,	in	our	experiment	in	this	essay:	discussing	
what	Foucault	meant	by	parrhesia	and	its	connection	to	democracy,	and	turning	to	
contemporary	examples	to	evaluate	the	benefits	of	applying	a	Foucaultian	perspective	to	
democracy	today.		
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First,	we	summarise	Foucault’s	definition	of	parrhesia	as	an	ancient	political	
practice.	Second,	we	address	the	connection	between	parrhesia	and	democracy	which	
eventually	led	to	the	former’s	problematisation	and	transformation.	Third,	we	explore	
Foucault’s	argument	that	freedom	was	a	vital	precondition	for	parrhesia,	but	practising	
parrhesia	also	represented	a	way	of	sustaining	freedom,	constituting	the	self,	and	
governing	others.	Finally,	we	use	this	analytics	of	government	to	discuss	the	modern	
examples	of	WikiLeaks	and	the	recent	revolutions	in	North	Africa,	recasting	the	“will	to	
democracy”	in	terms	of	governmental	rationalities	and	models	of	ethical	conduct,	rather	
than	as	a	Manichean	battle	between	warring	norms.	
	
Foucault’s	final	lectures	(2001;	2010;	2011)	explored	the	concept	of	parrhesia	
in	detail.3	He	described	parrhesia	as	a	way	of	telling	the	truth	which,	in	ancient	Athens,	
represented	a	virtue,	a	quality,	a	duty,	and	a	technique	(2010,	43).	He	traced	the	
transformation	of	parrhesia	from	the	political	activity	of	public	speaking	into	the	
Hellenistic	guiding	of	the	soul	of	the	sovereign,	and	thence	into	a	philosophical	notion	of	
truth	as	a	way	of	life.	He	identified	five	elements	of	parrhesia:	(1)	frankness/sincerity;	
(2)	coincidence	between	belief	and	truth;	(3)	danger	or	risk;	(4)	criticism;	(5)	duty	
(Foucault	2001,	14‐19).	Speech	qualified	as	parrhesia	when	it	expressed	beliefs	sincerely	
without	exaggerating	or	otherwise	enhancing	assertions	through	rhetorical	devices.	
These	beliefs	coincided	with	what	the	speaker	regarded	as	truth	(Foucault	2001,	14).	
Furthermore,	parrhesiastic	speech	entailed	the	risk	of	being	punished,	losing	political	
regard,	or	jeopardising	a	friendship	(Foucault	2001,	16)	because	of	its	sincere	and	blunt	
nature.	The	parrhesiastes’	courage	to	speak—despite	these	known	dangers—was	taken	
as	proof	of	sincerity	(Foucault	2001,	15).	The	parrhesiastes	challenged	someone	in	a	
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superior	social	or	political	position	(Foucault	2001,	17‐18)	with	the	aim	of	improving	his	
target’s	government	of	himself	and	others.	Finally,	the	parrhesiastes’	speech	was	
motivated	by	a	sense	of	duty	to	city,	people	and	leader,	yet	it	was	always	voluntary	
(Foucault	2001,	19).	This	duality	exemplified	the	complexity	of	the	practice	and	the	
courage	of	the	speaker,	as	he	endangered	his	life	in	order	to	benefit	others.	Foucault	
(2010,	301‐4)	also	provided	a	useful	summary	of	four	key	aspects	of	parrhesia:	its	
translation	from	democracy	into	other	fields;	its	moral	ambiguity,	as	it	was	no	longer	
seen	as	necessarily	good;	its	shift	in	focus	from	the	government	of	the	city	to	the	
government	of	self	and	thence	the	government	of	others;	and	its	insertion	into	the	
circuits	of	a	division	between	philosophy	and	rhetoric.4	
	
In	the	context	of	ancient	Athenian	democracy,	parrhesia	was	invoked	as	
something	more	than	free	speech	or	the	right	for	anyone	to	voice	his	opinion.	While	the	
constitutional	framework	of	democracy	granted	each	citizen	this	right	to	speak,	
parrhesia	was	linked	to	notions	of	‘ascendancy’	(Foucault	2010,	157),	where	some	
possessed	by	birth‐right	the	qualities	that	licensed	political	leadership.	Parrhesia,	then,	
connected	the	constitutional	right	to	speak	truth	with	the	exercise	of	political	power	
(Foucault	2010,	159):	‘the	place	of	parrhesia	was	defined	and	guaranteed	by	the	
politeia	the	city’s	constitution;	but	parrhesia,	the	truth‐telling	of	the	political	man,	
was	what	ensured	the	appropriate	game	of	politics’	(Foucault	2010,	159).	So	
parrhesia,	while	objectively	granted	to	and	potentially	practised	by	any	citizen,	required	
the	political	ascendancy	of	an	elite	who	possessed	the	requisite	qualities	to	recognise	
truth	and	its	beneficial	effect	for	others,	who	were	able	to	express	this	truth,	and	who	
were	willing	to	risk	being	punished	or	reprimanded	for	their	speech.	Parrhesia	was	a	
political	practice	that	could,	in	a	restricted	way,	challenge	power	and	effect	change.	
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Franěk	(2006,	119)	commented	that	‘parrhesia	was	so	highly	valued,	so	
precious	a	privilege,	because	it	was	the	basis	of	political	freedom’	in	ancient	Greece;	yet	
not	only	was	parrhesia	the	basis	of	freedom,	freedom	was	the	basis	of	parrhesia	
(Foucault	2010,	66).		Hence	the	relation	between	Athenian	democracy	and	parrhesia	
was	circular,	fragile	and	paradoxical.	Parrhesia	depended	on	the	existence	of	a	
democratic	constitution,	just	as	democracy	required	the	existence	of	truthful	free	speech	
in	order	to	function	successfully	(Foucault	2010,	155);	yet	the	political	ascendancy	of	
some	over	others	produced	an	imbalance	within	democracy,	which	endangered	its	
egalitarian	structure	(Foucault	2010,	183‐4).	Conversely,	democracy	threatened	the	
existence	of	true	discourse	because	the	latter	always	invoked	a	struggle	for	power	
(Foucault	2010,	184).	Parrhesia,	then,	could	become	distorted:	bad	parrhesia,	which	was	
characterised	not	by	truth,	but	by	flattery	and	consensual	opinion	(Foucault	2010,	183).	
The	structural	conditions	of	democracy	made	the	emergence	of	truth‐telling	‘difficult,	
improbable,	and	dangerous’	(Foucault	2011,	60).	In	the	democratic	city,	which	was	
governed	by	the	many,	it	was	unlikely	that	all,	or	even	the	majority,	were	virtuous,	noble	
truth‐tellers	who	would	act	in	the	common	interest.	The	free	speech	that	was	voiced	and	
heard	in	democracy,	then,	was	generally	not	truthful	but	rather	manipulative	and	self‐
serving	(Foucault	2011,	60‐1).		
	
Foucault	(2010,	193‐4)	cited	Plato	to	illustrate	how	this	problematisation	of	
parrhesia	in	the	democratic	context	coincided	with	its	translation	into	non‐democratic	
forms	of	government.	After	the	rise	of	the	monarchies	in	Hellenistic	Greece,	the	
parrhesiastes	was	no	longer	a	politician	who	publicly	addressed	an	assembly,	but	a	
sovereign’s	personal	advisor	(Foucault	2001,	22‐3).	In	guiding	the	moral	conduct	of	the	
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Prince,	parrhesia	shifted	from	being	a	privilege	of	freedom,	performed	in	the	city,	to	a	
practice	exercised	in	relation	to	the	soul	(Foucault	2011,	64).	Thus	parrhesia	developed	
a	psychagogical	facet	(Foucault	2010,	194).	This	movement	of	parrhesia	out	of	the	
democratic	assembly	into	the	courtroom	of	Hellenistic	monarchies	allowed	it	to	be	
employed	by	philosophers	who	saw	truth	as	a	way	of	life	(Foucault	2010,	343).	These	
transformations	of	parrhesia	represented	the	four	great	problems	of	ancient	political	
thought:	the	question	of	the	ideal	city;	the	question	of	whether	democracy	or	autocracy	
was	the	best	way	of	governing;	the	question	of	how	to	form	and	educate	the	souls	of	the	
citizens	of	a	democracy	or	of	the	sovereign	in	an	autocracy;	and	the	question	of	who	was	
capable	of	exercising	parrhesia	to	govern	the	citizens	of	a	democracy	or	the	sovereign	in	
an	autocracy	(Foucault	2010,	195‐6).	
	
Such	questions	are	still	relevant	for	politicians	and	philosophers	today.	While	
Foucault’s	focus	was	on	democracy	and	its	problematisation	in	ancient	Greece,	his	study	
represents	an	interesting	point	of	departure	for	the	analysis	of	the	functioning	of	
modern	democracy.	As	Beaulieu	(2010,	145)	noted,	what	Foucault	described	is	not	the	
tolerant	democracy	where	everyone	can	speak,	but	a	provocative	and	transformative	
truth‐telling	(Foucault	2010,	36‐7).	Likewise,	Milchman	and	Rosenberg	(2005,	350)	
asserted	that	‘we	are	today	again	experiencing	in	a	dramatic	way,	in	our	liberal	
democracy,	the	danger	or	risk	of	telling	truth	to	power’,	while	Simon	(2005)	argued	that	
Foucault’s	work	can	be	pressed	into	service	to	think	about	how	the	9/11	Commission	
functioned.		
	
Two	contemporary	examples	demonstrate	how	parrhesia	is	still	relevant	to	
understanding	what	types	of	practices	and	subjectivities	condition	modern	democracy.	
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Our	first	example,	WikiLeaks,	illustrates	how	parrhesiastic	speech	encompasses	the	
potential	for	challenging	power	relations	and	governmental	practices	in	existing	
democratic	constitutions,	and	highlights	the	paradoxical	relationship	between	parrhesia	
and	democracy.	The	second,	the	recent	uprisings	in	North	Africa,	exemplifies	how	a	“will	
to	truth”	enables	the	uprooting	and	replacement	of	existing	structures	of	government,	
and	also	elucidates	the	connection	between	parrhesia,	freedom	and	subjectification.	
Foucault	(2011,	29)	suggested	that	the	role	of	parrhesia	in	modern	societies	is	not	yet	
well	understood.	He	posited	four	major	ways	of	speaking	truth―as	prophet,	sage,	
technician	or	parrhesiast―but	wondered	if	the	parrhesiastic	function	only	survived	
today	if	underpinned	by	one	of	the	other	three.	So,	for	example,	revolutionary	or	critical	
discourse	might	be	parrhesiastic,	but	reliant	on	a	prophetic	form	of	veridiction	(2011,	
28‐30).	This	seems	to	be	the	case	in	relation	to	our	two	examples,	although	we	do	not	
have	the	space	to	develop	this	notion	in	detail	here;	we	focus	on	truth‐telling	in	a	
general	sense	to	suggest	that	it	enables	a	path	to	(improved)	democracy,	imbricate	with	
notions	of	freedom	and	the	government	of	self	and	others.	
	
WikiLeaks	is	an	international	non‐profit	organisation,	in	existence	since	2006,	
which	acts	as	a	secure	medium	through	which	whistleblowers	can	disseminate	secret	or	
classified	information:	a	domain	in	which	“truthful	speech”	can	be	collected	and	safely	
published.	While	those	who	possess	controversial	information	are	able	to	remain	
anonymous	and	protected,	unlike	a	Greek	parrhesiastes,	it	is	WikiLeaks	itself	which	
takes	on	the	parrhesiastic	role.	Nayar	(2010,	27)	emphasised	that	WikiLeaks	represents	
a	cultural	phenomenon	of	truth‐telling	that	can	and	should	not	be	‘personalised‐
individualised’.	The	organisation	claims	that	its	main	aim	is	‘to	be	of	assistance	to	
people	of	all	regions	who	wish	to	reveal	unethical	behavior	in	their	governments	and	
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corporations’	(WikiLeaks	2008).	It	sees	openness	and	transparency	as	the	key	to	
‘generating	…	true	democracy	and	good	governance’	and	aims	for	‘maximum	political	
impact’	(WikiLeaks	2008).	While	the	site	initially	sought	primarily	to	support	those	
under	oppressive,	non‐democratic	governments	in	exposing	corruption,	the	release	of	
Iraq	and	Afghan	war	documents	and	the	leaking	of	American	diplomatic	cables	in	2010	
reveals	that	there	is	a	role	for	parrhesia	in	modern	democratic	contexts.	While	the	US	
government	attacked	WikiLeaks	for	endangering	diplomatic	process	and	the	safety	of	
individuals,	claiming	that	governments	sometimes	need	to	keep	certain	information	
from	the	public	for	political	and	security	purposes,	this	conflicts	with	democratic	
notions	of	transparency,	free	speech,	and	collective	decision‐making.	While	some	(see	
Mendelsohn	2010)	suggested	that	the	WikiLeaks	scandal	may	be	the	occasion	of	tighter	
controls	and	regulations	for	online	conduct	and	communication	and	the	stifling	of	free	
speech,	the	2010	scandal	has	reinforced	the	idea	of	the	revelation	of	the	truth	as	a	
political	act	which	challenges	governments	and	demands	greater	democratic	
accountability.		
	
Our	second	example,	the	uprisings	in	North	Africa,	also	exemplifies	how	the	
courage	to	speak	out	against	authority	can	transform	existing	relations	of	power.	This	
example	shows	that	parrhesia	is	also	possible	under	non‐democratic	conditions.	In	the	
unrests	in	Tunisia	in	late	2010	and	Egypt	in	early	2011,	ordinary	individuals	rose	up	
against	oppressive	regimes,	demanding	change.	In	Tunisia,	for	example,	Lina	Ben	
Mhenni	posted	photos	and	videos	to	her	blog	and	Facebook	site	of	murders	during	
government	crackdowns.	‘[T]here	were	no	journalists	doing	this.	And	moreover,	the	
official	media	started	to	tell	lies	about	what	was	happening’	(Ben	Mhenni	cited	in	Giglio	
2011).	Ben	Mhenni	used	the	internet	to	disseminate	truth	which	was	not	being	
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communicated	accurately	anywhere	else.	Another	Tunisian	activist	collected	photos,	
videos	and	other	resources	throughout	the	uprising	and	posted	them	on	Facebook	and	
Twitter,	not	only	to	inform	others	of	what	was	happening	but	also	‘to	feel	free—and	to	
say	what	I	believe’	(Ali	cited	in	Giglio	2011).	In	Egypt,	Asmaa	Mahfouz	employed	
Facebook	and	other	social	media	in	the	fight	against	the	corrupt,	dictatorial	government.	
In	an	interview	shortly	after	the	overthrow	of	Egyptian	President	Mubarak,	she	recalled	
that	she	used	Facebook	to	announce	that	she	was	heading	to	Tarhir	Square	in	downtown	
Cairo,	which	became	the	gathering	point	for	much	of	the	political	activity	in	the	city,	to	
‘demand	the	rights	of	the	people’.	In	her	Facebook	post	she	called	for	anyone	who	was	
also	worried	about	the	fate	of	their	country	to	come	with	her	(Mahfouz	2011).	
	
Through	the	use	of	Web	2.0	technologies,	these	activists	were	able	to	speak	out,	
share	with	the	world	what	was	going	on	in	their	homelands,	organise	action,	and	
eventually	help	effect	the	resignation	of	their	countries’	autocratic	rulers.	What	sets	this	
modern	truth‐telling	apart	from	ancient	Greek	parrhesia	is	the	notion	of	ascendancy;	
while	it	was	not	a	certain	birth‐right	that	determined	who	got	to	speak	out	in	the	
revolutions	in	Tunisia	and	Egypt,	it	did	take	certain	qualities—frankness	and	sincerity,	
courage	to	criticize	authorities,	belief	in	the	prospect	of	change,	a	sense	of	duty	to	one’s	
people—for	these	individuals	to	come	together	in	a	common	cause	to	achieve	
democracy.	Here	we	can	also	see	elements	of	a	psychagogic	practice:	parrhesiastic	
speech	operates	on	the	ethical	component	of	fellow	citizens,	showing	them	a	path	to	
freedom.	In	this	way,	the	interconnectedness	of	political	practices	and	techniques	of	
subjectification	in	the	constitution	of	democracy	is	made	evident.	
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Foucault	(2010,	184)	explicitly	connected	parrhesia	and	democracy	to	our	
modern	concerns:	‘In	a	time	like	ours,	when	we	are	so	fond	of	posing	the	problems	of	
democracy	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	power,	of	the	autonomy	of	each	in	the	exercise	
of	power,	in	terms	of	transparency	and	opacity,	and	of	the	relation	between	civil	society	
and	the	State,	I	think	it	may	be	a	good	idea	to	recall	this	old	question,	which	was	
contemporary	with	the	functioning	of	Athenian	democracy	and	its	crises,	namely	the	
question	of	true	discourse	and	the	necessary,	indispensable,	and	fragile	caesura	that	
true	discourse	cannot	fail	to	introduce	into	a	democracy	which	both	makes	this	
discourse	possible	and	constantly	threatens	it’.	His	concern	with	the	truth	in	his	final	
lectures	did	not	revolve	around	what	was	the	content	of	truth	but	rather	who	can	speak	
it	and	what	makes	its	expression	and	dissemination	possible.	In	describing	his	method	
as	the	‘history	of	thought’,	Foucault	(2001,	74)	asserted:	‘I	am	trying	to	analyze	the	way	
institutions,	practices,	habits,	and	behavior	become	a	problem	for	people	who	behave	in	
specific	sorts	of	ways,	who	have	certain	types	of	habits,	who	engage	in	certain	kinds	of	
practices,	and	who	put	to	work	specific	kinds	of	institutions’.	Foucault’s	work	sought	to	
understand	how	practices,	habits	and	behaviours	become	problematised,	how	people	
become	anxious	about	and	start	questioning	them,	and	how	this	sets	up	new	practices,	
habits	and	behaviours.	Equally,	we	are	not	concerned	with	normative	conceptions	of	
democracy	here,	but	rather	with	the	conditions	that	allow	for	democracy	to	be	invented,	
be	challenged	or	be	reshaped.	By	exploring	the	role	of	WikiLeaks	in	revealing	
information	that	a	democratic	government	wanted	to	keep	secret,	and	the	example	of	
activists	who	challenged	their	non‐democratic	governments	in	the	name	of	political	
change,	we	have	emphasised	the	important	role	of	truth‐telling	as	a	political	practice	
today.		
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While	parrhesia	does	not	function	exactly	as	it	did	in	ancient	Greece,	the	
paradoxical,	circular	relationship―democracy	and	parrhesia	are	both	conditions	and	
threats	for	one	another―is	still	evident	today.	When	modes	of	government,	the	practices	
they	employ,	and	the	subjectivities	that	they	shape	become	problematic,	truthful	free	
speech	is	involved	in	their	being	questioned	and	reshaped.	In	its	connections	to	politics,	
freedom,	and	self‐examination,	parrhesia	still	represents	a	vital	means	of	figuring	out	
what	is	the	best	way	of	governing,	how	to	form	and	educate	the	souls	of	citizens	and	
who	may	be	best	suited	to	so	doing.	In	this	way,	taking	a	Foucaultian	approach	to	the	
political	relevance	of	free	speech	by	seeking	to	understand	the	conditions	for	democracy	
to	be	possible	is	a	very	different	endeavour	to	postulating	normative	assertions	about	
what	democracy	should	look	like.	Like	Foucault,	we	are	not	looking	to	the	ancient	world	
for	a	solution	to	modern	problems	but	as	a	way	to	find	clues	for	the	relations	between	
truth‐telling	and	the	government	of	self	and	others.	
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1	We	thank	Matthew	Ball,	Christian	Callisen,	Peter	O’Brien	and	our	anonymous	referees	for	comments	on	
earlier	drafts.	
2	Parrhesia	meant	‘outspokenness,	frankness,	freedom	of	speech’	but	also	excessive	speech	or	gossip	
(‘licence	of	tongue’)	(Liddell	and	Scott	1843,	1344).	
3	Important	treatments	of	parrhesia	are	also	given	in	Foucault	(1982;	2005).	
4	Foucault	has	been	criticised	for	selecting	texts	that	create	an	unrepresentative	notion	of	parrhesia	(see	
Franěk	2006;	McGushin	2007).	Franěk	(2006,	118),	for	example,	argued	that	it	‘seems	that	Foucault	
needed	to	construe	this	ideal	notion	of	parrhesia	to	be	able	to	trace	its	displacement	into	ethics—and	to	be	
able	to	address	the	relation	of	ethics	and	politics’.	
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Pithy	sentences	for	blow	ups:	
1) the	release	of	Iraq	and	Afghan	war	documents	and	the	leaking	of	American	
diplomatic	cables	in	2010	reveals	that	there	is	a	role	for	parrhesia	in	modern	
democratic	contexts	
	
2) In	the	unrests	in	Tunisia	in	late	2010	and	Egypt	in	early	2011,	ordinary	
individuals	rose	up	against	oppressive	regimes,	demanding	change.	
	
3) Through	the	use	of	Web	2.0	technologies,	these	activists	were	able	to	speak	out,	
share	with	the	world	what	was	going	on	in	their	homelands,	organise	action,	and	
eventually	help	effect	the	resignation	of	their	countries’	autocratic	rulers.	
